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- """Replay-history sanitization shared by EVERY resume surface (messaging gateway, TUI/WebUI gateway).
- A turn that died mid-tool-loop (restart command, stale timeout, interrupt before the result was written)
- persists a dangling ``assistant(tool_calls)`` or interrupted ``assistant→tool`` tail; on resume the model
- re-issues the unanswered call → endless "thinking"/reboot loop. These pure helpers strip those tails."""
- from __future__ import annotations
- import json
- import logging
- import math
- import re
- import time
- from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
- from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import make_tool_result_message
- from agent.tool_result_classification import tool_may_have_side_effect
- from agent.turn_context import drop_stale_api_content
- from hermes_cli.timefmt import coerce_epoch
- logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
- # Orphan-recovery notices: (side-effecting, read-only) for an interrupted block vs a dangling tail.
- _INTERRUPTED_NOTICES = (
- "[Orphan recovery: interrupted side-effecting tool may have executed; its effect is UNKNOWN. Inspect state before retrying.]",
- "[Orphan recovery: interrupted read-only tool did not complete.]",
- )
- _DANGLING_NOTICES = (
- "[Orphan recovery: this tool may have executed before Hermes stopped; its effect is UNKNOWN. Inspect current state before retrying.]",
- "[Orphan recovery: this read-only tool did not complete and had no effect.]",
- )
- # Every executor ends the killed run's ``output`` with a bracketed marker line: "[Command
- # interrupted]" (tools/environments/, exit 130), "[Command interrupted - Modal ...]"
- # (managed_modal.py, exit 130), "[execution interrupted ...]" (code_execution_tool.py, exit -1).
- _INTERRUPT_MARKER_LINE = re.compile(r"^\[(?:command|execution) interrupted\b[^\n]*\]\s*$", re.IGNORECASE)
- def is_interrupted_tool_result(content: Any) -> bool:
- """True only when the result has the executor's interrupt SHAPE: the marker is the last
- line of the output (JSON envelope with a non-zero exit code, or a bare text result). A
- marker quoted inside successful output — a grep hit, a doc example — is ordinary data;
- this runs on every live request, so a false positive rewrites real tool output."""
- if not isinstance(content, str):
- return False
- output = content
- if content.lstrip().startswith("{"):
- try:
- envelope = json.loads(content)
- except ValueError:
- return False
- if not isinstance(envelope, dict) or envelope.get("exit_code") in (0, None):
- return False
- output = envelope.get("output")
- if not isinstance(output, str):
- return False
- last_line = output.rstrip().rsplit("\n", 1)[-1]
- return _INTERRUPT_MARKER_LINE.match(last_line) is not None
- def _call_name(call: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
- return str((call.get("function") or {}).get("name") or "")
- def _call_id(call: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
- return str(call.get("id") or call.get("call_id") or "")
- def _any_side_effecting(calls: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> bool:
- return any(tool_may_have_side_effect(_call_name(call)) for call in calls)
- def _orphan_recovery(name: str, notices: tuple) -> tuple:
- """(effect_disposition, content) for an interrupted/dangling call named ``name``."""
- if tool_may_have_side_effect(name):
- return "unknown", notices[0]
- return "none", notices[1]
- def strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
- """Strip interrupted assistant→tool blocks anywhere in history (a queued user message may follow one).
- Read-only blocks are dropped; blocks with a side-effecting call are KEPT with the interrupted results
- rewritten as orphan-recovery notices, since the effect may have happened."""
- if not agent_history:
- return agent_history
- cleaned: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
- i, n = 0, len(agent_history)
- while i < n:
- msg = agent_history[i]
- if msg.get("role") == "assistant" and "tool_calls" in msg:
- j = i + 1
- while j < n and agent_history[j].get("role") == "tool":
- j += 1
- tool_results = agent_history[i + 1:j]
- if any(is_interrupted_tool_result(m.get("content", "")) for m in tool_results):
- calls = msg.get("tool_calls") or []
- if _any_side_effecting(calls):
- call_names = {_call_id(call): _call_name(call) for call in calls}
- cleaned.append(msg)
- for tool_result in tool_results:
- if is_interrupted_tool_result(tool_result.get("content", "")):
- name = call_names.get(str(tool_result.get("tool_call_id") or ""), "")
- disposition, content = _orphan_recovery(name, _INTERRUPTED_NOTICES)
- tool_result = {**tool_result, "effect_disposition": disposition, "content": content}
- cleaned.append(tool_result)
- else:
- logger.debug("Stripping interrupted read-only assistant→tool replay block (indices %d–%d, tool_results=%d)",
- i, j - 1, len(tool_results))
- i = j
- continue
- if msg.get("role") == "tool" and is_interrupted_tool_result(msg.get("content", "")):
- logger.debug("Stripping orphan interrupted tool result from replay history")
- else:
- cleaned.append(msg)
- i += 1
- return cleaned
- def strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
- """Strip a trailing ``assistant(tool_calls)`` with NO answers — a call that killed the gateway itself
- (``docker restart``) left zero ``tool`` rows, invisible to ``strip_interrupted_tool_tails``. A partially
- answered block still resumes. Read-only tails are dropped; side-effecting ones get UNKNOWN-effect results.
- On resume the model sees an unanswered tool call at the tail and naturally re-issues it — which restarts
- the gateway again, producing the infinite reboot loop in #49201. ``strip_interrupted_tool_tails`` does
- not catch this because there is no tool result to inspect for an interrupt marker.
- """
- if not agent_history:
- return agent_history
- last = agent_history[-1]
- if not (isinstance(last, dict) and last.get("role") == "assistant" and last.get("tool_calls")):
- return agent_history
- tool_calls = last.get("tool_calls") or []
- if _any_side_effecting(tool_calls):
- recovered = list(agent_history)
- for call in tool_calls:
- name = _call_name(call) or "unknown"
- disposition, content = _orphan_recovery(name, _DANGLING_NOTICES)
- recovered.append(make_tool_result_message(name, content, _call_id(call), effect_disposition=disposition))
- logger.warning("Recovered dangling side-effecting tool call(s) as UNKNOWN instead of erasing them")
- return recovered
- logger.debug("Stripping dangling unanswered read-only assistant(tool_calls) tail (%d call(s))", len(tool_calls))
- return agent_history[:-1]
- def sanitize_replay_history(agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
- """Both strippers in canonical order (interrupted blocks, then dangling tail); same list object when nothing strips."""
- if not agent_history:
- return agent_history
- return strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history))
- def canonicalize_replay_history(
- agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]], *, now: Optional[float] = None
- ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
- """Apply every destructive replay transform in the shared, fixed order.
- Resume surfaces and the send path must serialize the same history bytes, or a
- resumed request diverges in the middle of the cached prefix.
- The input is never modified. ``now`` is the expiry clock; the send path passes the
- turn's admission time so every request in one turn sees the same bytes.
- """
- if not agent_history:
- return agent_history
- if now is None:
- now = time.time()
- cleaned = strip_interrupted_tool_tails(agent_history)
- cleaned = strip_dangling_tool_call_tail(cleaned)
- return strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations(cleaned, now=now)
- # --- Stale dangerous-confirmation text expiry ---
- # Short on purpose: a dangerous confirmation must not survive any restart or resume gap.
- # ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Stale dangerous-confirmation text
- # expiry (#59607) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_EXPIRY_SECONDS = 60.0
- # Phrases that unlock destructive host actions; case-insensitive substring match so trailing punctuation /
- # extra context still matches. Includes i18n variants from the original incident.
- _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_PATTERNS: tuple = (
- "confirm forced restart", "confirm forced reboot", "confirm shutdown", "confirm reboot", "confirm power off",
- "yes, delete everything", "confirm wipe", "confirm factory reset",
- "確認強制重開機", "確認強制重開", "確認重啟",
- )
- # Redacting in place (not deleting the message) preserves strict user/assistant alternation in the replay.
- _EXPIRED_CONFIRMATION_SENTINEL = (
- "[A high-risk confirmation previously given here has EXPIRED and must "
- "not be acted on. Ask the user to re-confirm explicitly before "
- "performing any destructive action.]"
- )
- def is_dangerous_confirmation(content: Any) -> bool:
- """True if user-message text contains a known dangerous confirmation phrase."""
- if not isinstance(content, str):
- return False
- lowered = content.strip().lower()
- return any(pattern in lowered for pattern in _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_PATTERNS)
- def strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations(
- agent_history: list[dict[str, Any]],
- *,
- now: float,
- expiry_seconds: float = _DANGEROUS_CONFIRMATION_EXPIRY_SECONDS,
- ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
- """Redact IN PLACE dangerous-confirmation text older than ``expiry_seconds`` in user messages: a confirmation
- surviving a restart reads as a fresh re-confirmation minutes later. Untimestamped messages (legacy
- transcripts, test scaffolding) are left untouched.
- See #59607.
- On the next inbound message — possibly a casual "are you there?" from the user minutes later — the LLM
- sees the stale confirmation and may interpret the new turn as a fresh re-confirmation, re-executing the
- destructive action. This is the failure mode reported in #59607.
- """
- if not agent_history:
- return agent_history
- cleaned: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
- for msg in agent_history:
- ts = msg.get("timestamp") if isinstance(msg, dict) and msg.get("role") == "user" else None
- if ts is None or not is_dangerous_confirmation(msg.get("content", "")):
- cleaned.append(msg)
- continue
- # A present-but-untrustworthy stamp (corrupt, or issued in the future relative to
- # the admission clock) is treated as expired: its age is unknowable, and keeping the
- # text (plus its api_content sidecar) would replay a live confirmation.
- ts_f = coerce_epoch(ts, field="message timestamp")
- age = math.inf if ts_f is None else now - ts_f
- if 0 <= age <= expiry_seconds:
- cleaned.append(msg)
- continue
- logger.debug(
- "Redacting stale dangerous-confirmation text in user message (age=%.1fs, expiry=%.1fs): %r",
- age, expiry_seconds, (msg.get("content") or "")[:80],
- )
- redacted = dict(msg)
- redacted["content"] = _EXPIRED_CONFIRMATION_SENTINEL
- # The api_content sidecar carries the exact bytes sent — the confirmation itself; replaying it would undo the redaction.
- drop_stale_api_content(redacted)
- cleaned.append(redacted)
- return cleaned
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