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- """Ink ``!cmd`` / ``{!cmd}`` on the shared owner: one captured shell command for a local session.
- The legacy sidecar ran ``subprocess.run(cwd=os.getcwd())`` in its own process: on the owner that is
- the daemon's directory (the install root for an auto-started one), not the session's launch cwd or
- ``-w`` worktree, and the sidecar's contract refused the ``session_id`` Ink sends (dokterdok N22).
- Here the command runs for exactly one local session, in its frozen launch cwd, behind the same
- hardline/dangerous-command refusal, with Hermes-managed secrets scrubbed from the child and the
- output redacted before it crosses the wire. Nothing enters the transcript or the admission FIFO.
- """
- import asyncio
- from functools import partial
- import json
- import os
- import subprocess
- from hermes_state_runtime import RuntimeStoreError
- TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
- _LOCAL_BACKENDS = frozenset({'', 'local'})
- def handlers(connection):
- return {'shell.exec': partial(shell_exec, connection)}
- async def shell_exec(connection, ref, params):
- command = params.get('command')
- if (set(params) - {'session_id', 'profile', 'command'} or not isinstance(ref.session_id, str)
- or not ref.session_id or not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip()):
- raise RuntimeStoreError('invalid_params')
- from gateway.session_busy_controls import authorize
- authorize(connection, ref, params, 'session:control')
- authority = connection.authority
- authority._require_admission_open()
- from gateway.session_local import authorize_local_source
- from gateway.session_policy import policy_for_source
- live = authority.sessions[ref.session_id]
- # Local terminal sessions only: an API, messaging or A2A session has no composer, and running
- # commands for it would be a remote-execution surface with no human at the keyboard.
- if authorize_local_source(authority.runner, live.source) is not True:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('permission_denied')
- policy = policy_for_source(authority.runner, live.source)
- if policy is None:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('permission_denied')
- # The frozen terminal policy chose a sandbox (docker, ssh, ...): the owner's host shell is not
- # that backend, so refuse rather than run on the host behind the session's back.
- # The refusal names the backend so the client can say where the command would have run.
- backend = str(json.loads(policy.terminal_json).get('TERMINAL_ENV') or '').strip().lower()
- if backend not in _LOCAL_BACKENDS:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('unsupported_terminal_backend', field='terminal.backend', detail=backend)
- from tools.approval_detection import detect_dangerous_command, detect_hardline_command
- if detect_hardline_command(command)[0] or detect_dangerous_command(command)[0]:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('dangerous_command')
- return await asyncio.to_thread(_run, command, policy.cwd)
- def _run(command, cwd):
- from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
- from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import windows_hide_flags
- from tools.environments.local import build_subprocess_env
- # shell=True keeps the user-facing !cmd grammar (pipes, redirects); the child never inherits
- # credentials the long-lived owner holds, nor a launch profile's .env residue in a routed one.
- if not os.path.isdir(cwd): # a deleted checkout / worktree: never fall back to the owner's cwd
- raise RuntimeStoreError('cwd_unavailable')
- env = build_subprocess_env(strip_launch_profile=True)
- try:
- result = subprocess.run(command, cwd=cwd, shell=True, env=env, capture_output=True,
- text=True, encoding='utf-8', errors='replace', timeout=TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
- stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, creationflags=windows_hide_flags(), check=False)
- except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('command_timeout') from None
- except OSError:
- raise RuntimeStoreError('command_failed') from None
- # Redact before tailing so a credential crossing the slice boundary cannot survive as fragments.
- stdout = redact_sensitive_text(result.stdout or '', force=True, redact_url_credentials=True)[-4000:]
- stderr = redact_sensitive_text(result.stderr or '', force=True, redact_url_credentials=True)[-2000:]
- return {'stdout': stdout, 'stderr': stderr, 'code': result.returncode}
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