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- """WS-upgrade auth credentials for gated mode.
- Browsers cannot set ``Authorization`` on a WebSocket upgrade, and gated mode has no token
- injected into the SPA, so two credential shapes exist: (1) single-use browser tickets
- (``mint_ticket`` / ``consume_ticket``) fetched via authenticated ``POST /api/auth/ws-ticket`` and
- passed as ``?ticket=`` on the upgrade — 30 s TTL, a leak is uninteresting; (2) a process-lifetime
- internal credential (``internal_ws_credential`` / ``consume_internal_credential``) for
- *server-spawned* WS clients (the embedded-TUI PTY child on ``/api/ws`` + ``/api/pub``), which
- reuse their attach URL on every reconnect, possibly >30 s after boot — minted once, never expires,
- multi-use, never injected into any HTML/SPA (leaves the process only via the child's environment,
- so browser XSS cannot read it; grants no more than a ticket). In-memory; ``time.time`` patchable.
- """
- from __future__ import annotations
- import secrets
- import threading
- import time
- from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple
- #: Long enough for ``getWsTicket()`` -> open WS, short enough that a leaked ticket is uninteresting.
- TTL_SECONDS = 30
- _lock = threading.Lock()
- _tickets: dict[str, tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]] = {} # ticket -> (expires_at, info)
- _internal_credential: Optional[str] = None # lazily minted; guarded by ``_lock``
- #: Identity recorded for internal-credential connections (audit logs distinguish them from tickets).
- INTERNAL_USER_ID = "server-internal"
- INTERNAL_PROVIDER = "server-internal"
- class TicketInvalid(Exception):
- """Ticket missing, expired, or already consumed."""
- def mint_ticket(*, user_id: str, provider: str, issuer: str = "",
- extra: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None) -> str:
- """One-shot base64url ticket (32 random bytes) bound to this identity; ``consume_ticket``
- hands the ``info`` dict back to the WS handler. ``extra`` rides along for routes that need
- server-chosen context (the Bot Desktop bridge pins the RFB socket's profile home here so a
- client can never pick another profile's screen)."""
- ticket = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
- info = {"user_id": user_id, "provider": provider, "minted_at": int(time.time()), **(extra or {})}
- if issuer:
- info["issuer"] = issuer
- with _lock:
- _tickets[ticket] = (int(time.time()) + TTL_SECONDS, info)
- _gc_expired_locked()
- return ticket
- def consume_ticket(ticket: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """Validate and consume (single-use). Raises :class:`TicketInvalid` on missing/expired/used."""
- now = int(time.time())
- with _lock:
- entry = _tickets.pop(ticket, None)
- if entry is None:
- # Truncated so misuse never logs the secret in full.
- truncated = (ticket[:8] + "…") if ticket else "<empty>"
- raise TicketInvalid(f"unknown ticket: {truncated}")
- expires_at, info = entry
- if expires_at < now:
- raise TicketInvalid("expired")
- return info
- def _gc_expired_locked() -> None:
- """Drop expired tickets. Caller must hold ``_lock``."""
- now = int(time.time())
- for t in [t for t, (exp, _) in _tickets.items() if exp < now]:
- _tickets.pop(t, None)
- def internal_ws_credential() -> str:
- """Process-lifetime internal WS credential, minted once. Never injected into the SPA or
- returned over REST — only passed to a spawned child via its environment."""
- global _internal_credential
- with _lock:
- if _internal_credential is None:
- _internal_credential = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
- return _internal_credential
- def consume_internal_credential(value: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
- """Validate an internal credential (NOT single-use); returns the fixed server-internal
- ``{user_id, provider}`` info dict, mirroring ``consume_ticket``. Constant-time compare; any
- value is rejected until a credential has been minted."""
- with _lock:
- expected = _internal_credential
- if not value or expected is None:
- raise TicketInvalid("no internal credential")
- if not secrets.compare_digest(value.encode(), expected.encode()):
- raise TicketInvalid("internal credential mismatch")
- return {"user_id": INTERNAL_USER_ID, "provider": INTERNAL_PROVIDER}
- def _reset_for_tests() -> None:
- """Test-only: drop all tickets and the internal credential."""
- global _internal_credential
- with _lock:
- _tickets.clear()
- _internal_credential = None
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