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- name: airlock
- title: airlock
- repo: https://github.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock
- sha: 4d3919745b97cd21d1448c04fc776b40f4552aa3
- subdir: airlock
- version: "0.3.0"
- description: >-
- Guardrails that follow what a conversation has read. Once a session reads untrusted content (a web page, a
- browser snapshot, an MCP or third-party plugin's output, a customer's message), airlock seals it: messages to
- anyone but the owner, network writes, pushes and deploys, memory, skill and cron writes, browser input, URLs
- that could carry data out and code that reaches the network go through Hermes's own approval gate. Walls hold
- in every session: credential paths and secret files, the guard's own files and Hermes's config, shell startup
- files, other profiles, commands that switch approvals off. Shell commands are read the way the shell reads
- them, so a command that computes or hides what it runs (eval, base64 | sh, $G push, wildcards, write-then-run)
- is refused until written in clear. Subagents inherit the seal. A project's AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md,
- .cursorrules or .hermes.md that Hermes loads at startup seals the session from its first turn until the owner
- has reviewed it (`hermes airlock trust`), and again when its content changes (a cloned repository, a pull). It also catches an injection by its signature:
- recognized secrets never leave in a call; a private marker in the agent's context locks the session if it shows
- up in a tool call; a send to an address the untrusted content named is blocked; repeated refusals lock the
- session; lookalike Unicode in commands is refused. A file behind a wall cannot leave as a message
- attachment, and attached files are checked for secrets. A call that names a cloud metadata service is
- refused. Plugin and MCP tools nobody admitted need approval. Observe mode, stop switch,
- `hermes airlock check|demo|log|trust`. On Windows, paths are read in every form Windows and Git Bash give them, and
- a path on another machine is refused without being opened. Tested on a corpus of 362 attacks and everyday
- commands, on Linux, macOS and Windows, and end to end in the official image.
- Disclosure — hooks only (pre_tool_call, post_tool_call, pre_llm_call, subagent_start, on_session_reset,
- post_approval_response), no tools. No network, no LLM call, runs no command. Reads the profile's config.yaml
- (home channels, approvals mode) and its own policy file (<HERMES_HOME>/airlock.yaml); lists directories to
- expand wildcards in commands it checks; reads the first 200 KB of each file a send_message attaches, locally, to
- look for secrets. On Windows, reads the machine's own name (no lookup), tests which drive letters exist, and
- imports tools.environments.local._find_bash to know Git Bash's root. On a session's first turn, imports
- agent.prompt_builder.discover_context_files and _project_context_suppressed and
- agent.runtime_cwd.resolve_context_cwd (guarded) to know which project context files Hermes loaded, and hashes
- them (sha256). Imports Hermes's attachment reader (gateway.platforms.base.BasePlatformAdapter.extract_media)
- to see exactly what a message would attach, with its own reader as a fallback.
- Writes under plugin-data/airlock: a journal of decisions, taints and
- approvals that includes tool arguments, truncated (journal.args: none leaves them out), the taint state, the
- stop switch and the context files the owner trusted (path and sha256). When nobody can approve (--yolo, /yolo, hermes -z, approvals.mode: off, cron, -q or webhook set to
- approve, a subagent under delegation.subagent_auto_approve) it blocks instead of letting Hermes auto-approve;
- to know it, it imports gateway.session_finite.unattended_turn and reads tools.approval (_yolo_active,
- _unattended_contexts, approval_context._get_approval_mode), each guarded, config.yaml as fallback (policy
- approvals_off: follow restores Hermes's behaviour). Install scan: caution,
- because the default policy and the shell reader name the patterns airlock guards against (startup files,
- crontab, credential commands, exfiltration shapes).
- maintainer: otsoa-dubief
- tier: community
- category: tools
- requires_hermes: ">=0.21.6"
- docs_url: https://github.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock#readme
- image: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/4d3919745b97cd21d1448c04fc776b40f4552aa3/docs/images/social-preview.png
- screenshots:
- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/4d3919745b97cd21d1448c04fc776b40f4552aa3/docs/images/live-session.gif
- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/4d3919745b97cd21d1448c04fc776b40f4552aa3/docs/images/how-it-works.png
- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/otsoa-dubief/airlock/4d3919745b97cd21d1448c04fc776b40f4552aa3/docs/images/check.png
- platforms: []
- known_issues:
- - "Built for in-process plugins (Hermes's default): under plugins.isolation: host it cannot tell third-party plugin tools from Hermes's own."
- capabilities:
- provides_tools: []
- provides_hooks:
- - pre_tool_call
- - post_tool_call
- - pre_llm_call
- - subagent_start
- - on_session_reset
- - post_approval_response
- provides_middleware: []
- requires_env: []
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