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- """Security checks for user-configured MCP server entries.
- Blocks three narrow shapes (see ``validate_mcp_server_entry``), including a hardcoded IOC blocklist
- for the June 2026 hermes-0day campaign. Runs BOTH at save time (``_save_mcp_server`` — dashboard API +
- CLI) and at spawn time (``tools.mcp_tool._filter_suspicious_mcp_servers``), so a hand-edited or
- pre-planted ``config.yaml`` entry is caught before it can execute.
- """
- from __future__ import annotations
- import os
- import re
- import shlex
- from typing import Any
- _SHELL_INTERPRETERS = frozenset({
- "bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "fish", "cmd", "cmd.exe", "powershell", "powershell.exe", "pwsh", "pwsh.exe",
- })
- _EGRESS_PATTERN = re.compile(
- r"(?<![\w.-])(?:curl|wget|nc|ncat|socat)(?![\w.-])"
- r"|/dev/tcp/"
- r"|\bInvoke-WebRequest\b"
- r"|\bInvoke-RestMethod\b"
- r"|\bSystem\.Net\.WebClient\b",
- re.IGNORECASE,
- )
- _EXFIL_HINT_PATTERN = re.compile(
- r"\.env\b|--data-binary|--data-raw|\b-X\s+POST\b|\bPOST\b|<\s*[^\s]+",
- re.IGNORECASE,
- )
- # OS persistence surfaces an MCP server has no legitimate reason to write to (the hermes-0day
- # SSH-key/PAM/sudoers/cron shape). Matched anywhere in the inline script.
- _PERSISTENCE_PATTERN = re.compile(
- r"authorized_keys" # SSH key persistence (the campaign's payload)
- r"|\.ssh/" # any write under ~/.ssh
- r"|/etc/ssh\b" # sshd_config / AuthorizedKeysCommand backdoor
- r"|/etc/pam\.d\b|pam_[\w-]+\.so" # PAM credential logger
- r"|/etc/sudoers" # sudoers escalation
- r"|/etc/cron|crontab\b" # cron persistence
- r"|/etc/rc\.local|/etc/systemd" # init / unit persistence
- r"|\.bashrc\b|\.bash_profile\b|\.profile\b|\.zshrc\b", # shell rc backdoor
- re.IGNORECASE,
- )
- # Indicators of compromise, June 2026 hermes-0day campaign: exact attacker artifacts observed on
- # multiple compromised public instances. Hardcoded so a pre-planted config.yaml is refused.
- _IOC_SUBSTRINGS = (
- "AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAICBoh1oDC4DnsO1m5mJ4yfEKrQebaFh", # attacker SSH public key
- "hermes-0day",
- # Attacker source IPs seen authenticating with the key.
- "60.165.167.",
- "118.182.244.156",
- "61.178.123.196",
- )
- def _command_basename(command: Any) -> str:
- text = str(command or "").strip()
- if not text:
- return ""
- try:
- parts = shlex.split(text, posix=(os.name != "nt"))
- except ValueError:
- parts = text.split()
- first = parts[0] if parts else text
- return os.path.basename(first).lower()
- def _inline_script(args: Any) -> str:
- if args is None:
- return ""
- if isinstance(args, (list, tuple)):
- return " ".join(str(item) for item in args)
- return str(args)
- def _entry_text(entry: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
- """Flatten command + args + env values into one string for IOC scanning."""
- parts: list[str] = [str(entry.get("command") or "")]
- parts.append(_inline_script(entry.get("args")))
- env = entry.get("env")
- if isinstance(env, dict):
- parts.extend(str(v) for v in env.values())
- return " ".join(parts)
- def validate_mcp_server_entry(name: str, entry: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
- """Return security warnings for an MCP server entry (empty = not suspicious).
- Intentionally not a whitelist — custom commands, Python scripts, npx, uvx stay legal. Only three
- narrow shapes are blocked: (1) a known IOC anywhere in command/args/env, (2) a shell interpreter
- with network egress in its inline script, (3) a shell interpreter writing an OS persistence surface.
- * a shell interpreter whose inline script writes to an OS persistence surface (June 2026 hermes-0day
- SSH/PAM/sudoers/cron shape). See #45620.
- """
- if not isinstance(entry, dict):
- return []
- issues: list[str] = []
- flat = _entry_text(entry)
- for ioc in _IOC_SUBSTRINGS:
- if ioc in flat:
- # One IOC is enough to refuse; don't leak the full match list.
- issues.append(
- f"MCP server '{name}' contains a known hermes-0day "
- f"indicator-of-compromise ('{ioc}')"
- )
- return issues
- command = entry.get("command")
- if _command_basename(command) not in _SHELL_INTERPRETERS:
- return issues
- script = _inline_script(entry.get("args"))
- if not script:
- return issues
- if _EGRESS_PATTERN.search(script):
- issue = (
- f"MCP server '{name}' uses shell interpreter '{command}' with "
- f"network egress in args"
- )
- if _EXFIL_HINT_PATTERN.search(script):
- issue += " and exfiltration-shaped arguments"
- issues.append(issue)
- if _PERSISTENCE_PATTERN.search(script):
- issues.append(
- f"MCP server '{name}' uses shell interpreter '{command}' to write "
- f"to an OS persistence surface (SSH keys / PAM / sudoers / cron / "
- f"shell rc) — this is the hermes-0day backdoor shape, not a real "
- f"MCP server"
- )
- return issues
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